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CASE COMMENT
MINORS' RIGHT TO LITIGATE PRIVACY INTERESTS WITHOUT
PARENTAL NOTICE
M.S. v. Wermers, 557 F.2d 170 (8th Cir. 1977).
In M.S. v. Wermers,l the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that
a plaintiff's failure to comply with a court order was not grounds for
dismissing a suit if obedience to the order would have a chilling effect
on the privacy right plaintiff sought to vindicate. M.S., an unmarried
minor, brought a class action alleging that a state health clinic's policy
requiring parental consent before dispensing contraceptives to minors
violated her constitutional right to privacy. 2 The trial court ordered
the appointment of a guardian ad litem for M.S. and parental
notification of the appointment hearing.' M.S. refused to notify her
parents, claiming notice would chill the privacy right she was assert-
ing.4 The district court dismissed the suit under Rule 41(b) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure' but the Eighth Circuit reversed, and
held: Dismissal under Rule 41(b) for failure to obey a court order is an
1. 557 F.2d 170 (8th Cir. 1977).
2. Id. at 173. See notes 37-39 infra. M.S. brought the action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976) claiming the state health clinic denied her and others similarly situated privacy interests
guaranteed by the 14th amendment. For a contemporary discussion of § 1983 actions, see
grenerally H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 87-96 (1973); Chevigny, Sec-
tion 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1352 (1970); McCormack, Federalisrm and Sec-
ion 1983: Limitations on JudicialEnforcement of Constitutional Protections, Part 1, 60 VA. L. REv.
1, 3-28 (1974).
3. 557 F.2d at 173 n.2.
4. Id.
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b) provides in pertinent part:
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of
court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him.
After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the
presentation of his evidence, the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in
the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon
the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the
facts may then determine them ano render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline
to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence.
While Rule 41(b) states the defendant may move to dismiss, courts may invoke this dismissal
power sua sponte. Stanley v. Continental Oil Co., 536 F.2d 914, 916-17 (10th Cir. 1976); Welsh v.
Automatic Poultry Feeder Co., 439 F.2d 95,96 (8th Cir. 1971). See generally 9 C. WRMIHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2369, at 191 (1971).
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abuse of judicial discretion when obedience to the order would chill the
privacy interest the litigant seeks to protect.6
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes federal
courts to dismiss an action for failure to comply with a court order.7
The rule protects the integrity of the court order,8 allows courts to dis-
pose of their caseloads without undue delays,9 and enables them to
control their dockets.' 0 Involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b), how-
ever, has been described as "the most severe sanction that a court may
apply"" because it denies judicial access for procedural rather than
6. 557 F.2d at 176.
7. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-32 (1962); Stanley v. Continental Oil Co.,
536 F.2d 914, 917 (10th Cir. 1976); Von Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp., 529 F.2d 943, 947 (9th Cir.
1976); Fender v. Westgate-California Corp., 527 F.2d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir. 1975); Darlington v.
Studebaker-Packard Corp., 261 F.2d 903, 905 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 192 (1959). See
also Note, Involuntary Dismissalsfor Disobedience or Delay: The Plaintifl's Plight, 34 U. CHI. L.
REV. 922 (1966).
Most state jurisdictions have a similar rule of procedure or statute permitting involuntary dis-
missals for failure to prosecute or comply with court orders. See, e.g., ALA. R. Civ. P. 41(b);
ARiz. R. Civ. P. 41(b); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 581,581a, 583 (Deering 1972); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.
420(b), (e); GA. CODE ANN. tit. 81A, § 141(b), (c), (e) (1977); IND. R. Civ. P. 41(b)(e); IOWA R.
Civ. P. 215; MICH. GEN. CT. R. 504.2; N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 3216 (West 1971); R.I. R. Civ. P.
41(b); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.56.120 (1962).
A Rule 41 dismissal is also the terminal sanction for a plaintiff's failure to prosecute or other
dilatory conduct. See, e.g., Santiago v. Rivera, 553 F.2d 710, 713 (1st Cir. 1977) (failure to appear
at pretrial conference); SEC v. Power Resources Corp., 495 F.2d 297, 298 (10th Cir. 1974) (per
curiam) (three year delay in presenting motion for preliminary injunction); Krodel v. Houghtal-
ing, 468 F.2d 887, 887-88 (4th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (failure to interview or subpoena witnesses
whose whereabouts plaintiff knew); Maiorami v. Kawasaki-Kisen K.K., 425 F.2d 1162, 1163 (2d
Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (plaintiff's counsel deliberately failed to appear at trial without requesting
an adjournment). In a nonjury case, Rule 41(b) allows the defendant to move for dismissal if, at
the close of the plaintiff's case, he has failed to show a right to relief. See James v. DuBreuil, 500
F.2d 155, 156 n.2 (5th Cir. 1974); Trask v. Susskind, 376 F.2d 17, 19 (5th Cir. 1967). See generally
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 5, § 2371.
Notwithstanding the statutory language of Rule 41(b), it has also been used to effect pretrial
discovery. See First Iowa Hydro Elec. Coop. v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 245 F.2d 613, 628
(8th Cir. 1957); Mooney v. Central Motor Lines, 222 F.2d 569, 571-72 (6th Cir. 1955). The prac-
tice of using Rule 41(b) in discovery has been criticized as being outside the scope of the rule.
See Societe Int'l v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 206-07 (1958). See generally Rosenberg, Sanctions to
Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 480, 480-84 (1958).
8. See Fendler v. Westgate-California Corp., 527 F.2d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir. 1975) (per
curiam).
9. See Canada v. Mathews, 449 F.2d 253, 255 (5th Cir. 1971); Syracuse Broadcasting Corp,
v. Newhouse, 271 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir. 1959).
10. See Pond v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 453 F.2d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 1972); Flaska v. Little
River Marine Constr. Co., 389 F.2d 885, 887 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 928 (1968).
11. Durham v. Florida E. Coast R.R., 385 F.2d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 1967). See also Boazman
v. Economics Laboratories, Inc., 537 F.2d 210, 212 (5th Cir. 1976); O'Brien v. Sinatra, 315 F.2d
637, 641 (9th Cir. 1963).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss2/7
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substantive reasons and has the same res judicata effect as a decision
on the merits.1 2
Dismissal of an action under Rule 41(b) is a matter of judicial discre-
tion'3 and an appellate court will reverse only for abuse of that discre-
tion.'4 In applying this standard of review, courts examine the
12. Rule 41(b) provides in pertinent part:
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19,
operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
Id. (emphasis added). See Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 285 (1961); Sepia Enterprises,
Inc. v. City of Toledo, 462 F.2d 1315, 1316-17 (6th Cir. 1972); Himalayan Indus. v. Gibson Mfg.
Co., 434 F.2d 403, 404 (9th Cir. 1970); Pearson v. Dennison, 353 F.2d 24, 27 (9th Cir. 1965);
Nasser v. Isthmian Lines, 331 F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 1964). See also 31 MD. L. REy. 85 (1971).
But see Madden v. Perry, 264 F.2d 169, 174-75 (7th Cir. 1959) (because Rule 41(b) derogates the
common law rule of res judicata, it should be strictly construed and not bar reaching the merits
later unless a court designates otherwise).
13. See Fendler v. Westgate-California Corp., 527 F.2d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir. 1975); Dewey v.
Farchone, 460 F.2d 1338, 1340 (7th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Marshall v. Farm Bureau Cas. Co., 36
F.R.D. 186, 188 (W.D. La. 1964), af/'d, 353 F.2d 737 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 910 (1966).
See generally Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962).
14. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962); Connolly v. Papachristi Shipping Ltd.,
504 F.2d 917, 920 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Inter-America Shipping Corp., 455 F.2d 938,
940 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Von Poppenheim v. Portland Boxing & Wrestling Comm'n, 442
F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1039 (1972). Cf. Marshall v. Sieboff, 492
F.2d 917, 918 (3d Cir. 1974) (abuse of discretion is also the standard of review for Rule 41(b)
dismissals for failure to prosecute). See also Michelsen v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 429
F.2d 394, 395 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Shafer v. Warehouse Employee's Local 730, 408 F.2d
204, 206 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 934 (1968).
The broad scope of discretion afforded trial courts in the implementation of Rule 41(b) can
produce seemingly harsh results. See, e.g., Hardin v. Brisco, 504 F.2d 885, 886 (5th Cir. 1974)
(per curiam) (court ordered prisoner to send a sworn statement to the court, but because prisoner
could not obtain notary service, compliance was impossible and the action was dismissed); United
States v. Inter-America Shipping Corp., 455 F.2d 938, 940 (5th Cir. 1972) (dismissal held abusive
where only six months had elapsed between filing of the complaint and the dismissal order);
Brown v. Thompson, 430 F.2d 1214, 1216-17 (5th Cir. 1970) (trial court dismissal for failure of the
plaintiff to offer evidence that was contained in inaccessible police files, held: reversed); Allied
Air Freight, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 393 F.2d 441, 444 (2d Cir.) (trial court dis-
missed and ordered plaintiff to seek redress from an administrative agency that was not empow-
ered to give the reliefsought by the plaintiff, held: reversed), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 846 (1968); Sf
Societe Int'l v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 204 (1958) (compliance with a discovery order under Rule 37
would have caused the plaintiff to violate foreign law, held: reversed).
The fear of abusive dismissals has caused at least one state to enact court rules that limit the
judge's discretion. See CAL. RULES OF COURT, Rule 203.5(e). This rule, however, has been used
sparsely. See Note, The Demise (Hopefully) ofAn Abuse: The Sanctions of Dismissal, 7 CAL. W.L.
REv. 438, 464 (1971).
For a general discussion of appellate review of Rule 41(b) dismissals, see Waterman, An Appel-
late Judge's Approach Wthen Reviewing District Court Sanctions Imposed For The Purpose of Insur-
ing Compliance With Pretrial Orders, 29 F.R.D. 420 (1961).Washington University Open Scholarship
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plaintiffs actions for evidence of delay or contumacious conduct I5 and
consider whether the order itself was proper.6 Dismissal under Rule
41(b) is erroneous if it is premised on plaintiffs failure to comply with
an improper or invalid order.17
Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure empowers courts
to issue any order-including appointment of a guardian ad litem-to
insure that the interests of minors seeking legal redress are protected by
a competent adult.'8 Although courts must consider whether appoint-
ment of a guardian ad litem is necessary whenever minors pursue liti-
gation,19 the appointment decision is within the trial court's
discretion.20 The minor's parents may be appointed guardians ad li-
15. Graves v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Co., 528 F.2d 1360, 1361 (5th Cir. 1976); Durham v.
Florida E. Coast Ry., 385 F.2d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 1967). See also Boazman v. Economics Labora-
tory, Inc., 537 F.2d 210, 213 (5th Cir. 1976); International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v.
Leona Lee Insulation & Specialties, Inc., 516 F.2d 504, 505 (5th Cir. 1975).
16. See Carpenter v. Carpenter, 156 F.2d 857, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (per curiam); Rossi v.
McCloskey & Co., 149 F. Supp. 638, 641 (D. Pa. 1957); note 17 infra.
17. Michael v. Clark Equip. Co., 380 F.2d 351, 352 (2d Cir. 1967) (dismissal for failure to
obey order of the court to "set forth causes of action clearly" reversed on the ground that there is
no requirement under the Federal Rules that a complaint state a cause of action); Original Ballet
Russe, Ltd. v. Ballet Theatre, Inc., 133 F.2d 187, 190 (2d Cir. 1943) (dismissal reversed because
order directing plaintiff to amend his pleadings held improper). See generall, First Iowa Hydro
Elec. Coop. v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 245 F.2d 613, 628 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
871 (1957).
18. FED. R. Cirv. P. 17(c) provides:
Whenever an infant or incompetent person has a representative, such as a general guard-
ian, committee, conservator, or other like fiduciary, the representative may sue or defend
on behalf of the infant or incompetent person. If an infant or incompetent person does
not have a duly appointed representative he may sue by his next friend or by a guardian
ad litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent
person not otherwise represented in an action or shall make such other order as it deems
proper for the protection of the infant or incompetent person.
For a discussion of the use of guardians ad litem, see Hohmann & Duyer, GuardlansAdLitem In
Wisconsin, 48 MARQ. L. REv. 445 (1965); Solender, The Guardian 4d Liten" .4 Valuable Repre-
sentative or an Illusory Safeguard, 7 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 619 (1976); Note, Guardians.4aditem, 6
IOWA L. REv. 376 (1960). For traditional views of the functions of the guardian ad litem, see J.
WOERNER, GUARDiANSHip § 21 (1897).
19. See Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9, 11 (6th Cir. 1974) (court's consideration of the propriety of
a guardian ad litem appointment deemed critical); Roberts v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35, 39
(5th Cir. 1958) (court's failure to consider the necessity of a guardian ad litem to protect the
interests of a minor litigant is grounds for reversal).
20. See, eg., Noe v.'True, 507 F.2d 9, 11-12 (6th Cir. 1974); Jacobs v. Board of School
Comm'rs, 490 F.2d 601, 603-04 (7th Cir. 1973), vacated as moot, 420 U.S. 128 (1975); Foe v.
Vanderhoff, 389 F. Supp. 947, 957 (D. Colo. 1975). See also 3A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
17.26, at 280 (2d ed. 1978). In state jurisdictions that have patterned their applicable rule of
procedure after FED. R. Civ. P. Rule 17(c), see note 18 supra, the appointment of a guardian ad
litem is also discretionary. See, e.g., COLo. R. Civ. P. 17(g); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 17(c); IowA R.
Civ. P. 17.
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tern, 21 but it is improper for the court to do so when there is a potential
conflict between the parents' interest and the right the minor is
asserting.2
2
Although minors are not accorded the full panoply of adult constitu-
tional rights,23 courts have upheld their right to sue without parental
approval,24 to free speech 25 and religion,26 and to due process2 7 and
While some jurisdictions provide for the mandatory designation of a guardian ad litem to repre-
sent minors or incompetent litigants, see, e.g., AR. STAT. ANN. § 27-823 (1947); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 3-115 (1959); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 26-1-3 (1976); TEX. R. Civ. P. 173, such appoint-
ments have been deemed procedural in nature, thus permitting federal courts to employ the dis-
cretionary elements of FED. R. Crv. P. Rule 17(c). See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bengston, 231
F.2d 263, 266 (5th Cir. 1956). See also Slade v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 418 F.2d 125, 126
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1007 (1970); Roberts v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35, 38-
39 (5th Cir. 1958). See generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 5, § 1571.
21. See United States v. Noble, 269 F. Supp. 814, 816 (E.D.N.Y. 1967). See also Note,
supra note 18, at 386. Courts, however, are not obligated to appoint the parents, see Fong Sik
Leung v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 74, 82 (9th Cir. 1955); the minor's attorney is more often designated as
guardian ad litem. See, ag., Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Ginsburg, 228 F.2d 881,883 (3d Cir.
1956); First Nat'l City Bank v. Gonzalez & Co., 308 F. Supp. 596, 600 (P.R. 1970); Greer v. Mid-
West Nat'l Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 305 F. Supp. 352, 354 (E.D. Ark. 1969). See also N.Y. SUtR. CT.
Paoc. ACT § 404 (McKinney 1967) (guardians ad litem must be attorneys).
22. Guerra v. American Colonial Bank, 21 F.2d 56, 61 (1st Cir. 1927); Horacek v. Exon, 357
F. Supp. 71, 74 (D. Neb. 1973) (mem.); Swift v. Swift, 61 F R.D. 595, 598 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); United
States v. Noble, 269 F. Supp. 814, 816 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); United States v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours &
Co., 13 F.R.D. 98, 105 (N.D. Ill. 1952); United States v. 15,883.55 Acres of Land, 45 F. Supp. 558,
561 (W.D.S.C. 1942); cf. Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9, 12 (6th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (state cannot
adequately represent a minor ward in a lawsuit by that minor to force the state to provide her with
an abortion; they have adverse interests); Salaices v. Sabraw, 400 F. Supp. 367, 368 (N.D. Cal.
1975) (mem.) (when a conventional guardian's interests obviously conflict with those of the child,
the court should appoint a separate guardian ad litem).
23. Constraints on the freedoms of minors may be acceptable "even though comparable re-
straints on adults would be constitutionally impermissible." Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 102 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See, e.g., Mc-
Keiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 554-56 (1971)(jury trial is not constitutionally required in
the adjudicative phase of a state juvenile court proceeding); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117-
18 (1970) (eighteen year olds may be denied the right to vote in state and local elections); Rowan
v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (parents may block a minor's access to
literature sent through the mail if they feel it is offensive); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
638 (1968) (obscenity standards may be more restrictive when applied to minors); Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (child labor laws may operate to circumscribe a minor's freedom
of religion). See generally Note, The Minor's Right to Abortion and the Requirement of Parental
Consent, 60 VA. L. REv. 305, 314 (1974).
24. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 145 (1975) (if parents refuse to allow their minor
daughter to obtain an abortion she may independently obtain a court order permitting her to
receive one). See also Roberts v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1958); T-H- v.
Jones, 425 F. Supp. 873 (D. Utah 1975); Doe v. Exon, 416 F. Supp. 716 (D. Neb. 1975); Swift v.
Swift, 61F.R.D. 595 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); 3A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE $ 17.26 (2d ed. 1978); 6 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1570 (1971 & Supp. 1978).
25. See Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (minor students allowedWashington University Open Scholarship
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equal protection.28 Limitations on minors' constitutional rights result
from balancing the minor's rights against the distinct interests of par-
ents and the state.29 While parents have a due process right to direct
the upbringing of their children,30 the state has an interest in protecting
minors from their own immature acts.31 The parents' "essential" right
to wear arm bands protesting government policy in Vietnam); Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (school officials may not compel students to salute the flag).
26. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225-26 (1963) (no
state or school board may require bible readings in a public school); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,
430 (1962) (prayers may not be recited in public schools).
27. The minor's due process rights have been rec6gnized primarily in the context of criminal
proceedings. "Neither man nor child can be allowed to stand condemned by methods which
flout constitutional requirements of due process of law." Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948)
(due process limitations apply to the extraction of confessions from a minor defendant). See also
Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1962).
Juvenile courts are also bound by some due process requirements. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31-
42 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557-63 (1966). See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519,
541 (1974) (Constitution protects minor from double jeopardy); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368
(1970) (standard of proof in adjudicatory stage of delinquency proceeding is "beyond a reasonable
doubt"). For an overview of the minor defendant's due process and equal protection rights dur-
ing the juvenile court process, see F. MILLER, R. DAwsoN, G. Dix, & R. PARNAS, THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE PROCESS 387-601 (2d ed. 1976). See generally NATIONAL JUVENILE LAW CENTER, LAW
AND TACTICS IN JUVENILE CASES (2d ed. 1974).
Minors are also entitled to due process rights in school disciplinary actions. See Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975) (dictum); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-76 (1975).
28. See, eg., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 537-38 (1973) (per curiam) (the denial of child
support benefits to illegitimate children violates the equal protection clause); Weber v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 176 (1972) (denial of death benefits to illegitimate children violates their
equal protection rights); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (segregation in public
schools violates students' equal protection rights).
29. See generally Bennett, Allocation of Child Medical Care DecisionmakingAuthorityA Sug-
gested Interest Anaysis, 62 VA. L. REV. 285 (1976); Note, Parental Consent Requirements and
Privacy Rights of Minors: The Contraceptive Controversy, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1001, 101416 (1975).
30. "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). See Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923);
Drollinger v. Milligan, 552 F.2d 1220, 1226 (7th Cir. 1977); Doe v. Irwin, 428 F. Supp. 1198, 1206-
07 (W.D. Mich. 1977). See generali, 1976 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 296, 300.
31. At common law infants do not possess the power to exercise the same legal rights as
adults. The disabilities of infants are really privileges, which the law gives them, and
which they may exercise for their own benefit, the object of the law being to secure
infants from damaging themselves or their property by their own improvident acts or
prevent them from being imposed on by others. The rights of infants must be protected
by the court, while adults must protect their own rights.
Dixon v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 798, 803 (W.D.S.C. 1961). See generally Note, Parental
Consent Abortion Statutes: The Limits of State Power, 52 IND. L.J. 837, 847 (1977); Note, supra
note 29, at 1007-08; 1974 UTAH L. REV. 433-35.
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to autonomy in childrearing32 may conflict with the state's interest 33 in
protecting children from their incapacity for self-determination, and
both can modify the minor's exercise of constitutional rights.34
The Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional privacy right in
decisions regarding contraceptives35 and abortions, 36 and has extended
it in a limited fashion to minors.37 In Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth,8 the Court held that the minor's privacy right prevents the
state from prohibiting abortions without parental consent;39 and in
The state's power over the minor is traditionally considered to emanate from its police power or
the concept of parens patriae, the responsibility of the state to care for a child whose natural
parents have either been unable to fulfill or have abdicated their responsibilities in the nurture of
the child. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 168 (1944). See generally Kleinfeld, The Balance of Po wer Among Infants, Their Parents
and The State, 5 FAM. L.Q. 64, 107 (1971).
32. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
33. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
34. See. e.g., Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (parents
may prohibit the mailing to their children of literature that they deem offensive); Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) (the state may more restrictively pro-
hibit the sale of obscene literature to children); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1943)
(state has the power to restrict child labor); United States v. DiPrima, 472 F.2d 550, 551 (1st Cir.
1973) (parents may waive child's protection against unconstitutional search and seizure); Merriken
v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913, 921 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (parents may waive their children's fifth
amendment rights against self-incrimination by allowing them to fill out a questionnaire designed
to identify potential drug abusers). But see Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1048 (E.D.
Pa. 1975) (absent a showing that his interests have been fully protected, parents may not waive
their child's due process rights). See also 12 U. RICH. L. REv. 221, 227 (1977).
35. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 452-55 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484-85 (1965).
36. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 189 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
The Supreme Court has also identified privacy interests in marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); and child rearing,
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). For an excellent description of the gene-
sis and contemporary status of these rights, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITtbONAL LAW § 15
(1978).
37. "[Tlhe right to privacy in connection with decisions affecting procreation extends to mi-
nors as well as to adults." Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). See generally
notes 39-48 infra and accompanying text. See also Note, Third Party Consent to Abortions Before
and After Danforth: A TheoreticalAnalysis, 15 J. FAM. L. 508, 520 (1977).
38. 428 U.S. 52 (1976)
39. Id. at 74. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (5th
Cir. 1975); Abortion Coalition of Mich., Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Pub. Health, 426 F. Supp. 471
(E.D, Mich. 1977); Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's Servs., Inc. v. Bowen, 421 F. Supp. 734 (N.D.
Ind. 1976), affd mem., 429 U.S. 1067 (1977); Foe v. Vanderhoof, 389 F. Supp. 947 (D. Colo.
1975); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973); State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530
P.2d 260 (1975); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1065.1, :1095-96 (Supp. 1977) (statutory authorization
for minors to receive nontherapeutic abortions without parental consent).
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Carey v. Population Services International' it invalidated New York's
blanket prohibition of the distribution of contraceptives to minors.41
Although absolute restrictions are unconstitutional, the Court has in-
dicated that a minor's privacy right may be narrowed to accommodate
the competing interests of parents and the state.42 In Danforth, four
justices found the parental consent requirement satisfactory,43 and Jus-
tices Stewart and Powell, although rejecting the absolute parental veto,
endorsed some parental involvement in the decisionmaking process. 44
The Court, in Bellotti v. Baird,4 remanded a challenge to a statute
providing that a minor could obtain a court order granting her abortion
for "good cause shown" despite her parents' refusal of consent.4 6 If
the state interpreted the statute as not unduly burdening the minor's
right to abort but simply as preferring parental consultation, the Court
indicated that it would be upheld.47 Justice Powell stated in his Carey
concurrence that a parental consultation requirement would not imper-
40. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
41. The court found the statute not rationally related to the state's asserted interest in inhib-
iting minors' sexual activities. Id. at 691-96. See also T-H- v. Jones, 425 F. Supp. 73 (D.
Utah 1975), afj'd, 425 U.S. 986 (1976). But see Doe v. Irwin, 428 F. Supp. 1198 (W.D. Mich.
1977).
There have been fewer cases challenging the restriction of minors' contraceptive rights because
many states recognize the minor's right to obtain contraceptives. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. §
13-22-105 (1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 99-3103 (1976); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91, § 18.7 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 135(a) (1971); ORE. Rnv. STAT. § 109.640 (1971); VA.
CODE § 32-137(7) (Supp. 1976).
At least one court has also held that minors have a privacy interest in their identity. See
Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973). For a general discussion concerning
minors' interest in the integrity of their own bodies, see Bennett, supra note 29, at 311.
42. See 431 U.S. at 703-12 (Powell, J., concurring). See generally notes 30-34 supra and
accompanying text.
43. 428 U.S. at 92-105 (Burger, C.J., White, Rehnquist, & Stevens, J J.).
44. There can be little doubt that the State furthers a constitutionally permissible end by
encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her parents in
making the very important decision whether or not to bear a child. That is a grave
decision, and a girl of tender years, under emotional stress, may be ill-equipped to make
it without mature advice and emotional support.
Id. at 91 (Stewart, J., concurring).
45. 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
46. Id. at 134-36. In order to receive judicial permission, the minor had to show "good
cause." Id. at 135. The court stated that "good cause" is shown when it is demonstrated that the
abortion is in the child's best interests. .d. at 145.
47. Id. See generally Note, Parental Consent Abortion Statutes: The Limits of State Power,
52 IND. L.J. 837, 840-44 (1977). Bellotti was decided by a unanimous Court on the same day as
Danforth. See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
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missibly interfere with a minor's right to contraceptives. 48
In M.S. v. Wermers,49 the Eighth Circuit acknowledged the district
court's obligation to consider the appointment of a guardian ad litem
and its power to order a hearing for that purpose,"° but found that the
lower court abused its discretion when it dismissed plaintiffs claim.51
The court noted the absence of "a clear record of delay or contuma-
cious conduct by the plaintiff '5 2 that would have justified dismissal;53
although plaintiff had initially opposed the appointment of a guardian
ad litem, she later suggested potential candidates for the position.5 4
The court then examined the propriety of the court order.5 5 Because
plaintiff was challenging the constitutionality of a parental veto over a
minor's access to contraceptives,56 Judge Webster, for the court, con-
cluded that it would be inappropriate to appoint the minor's parents as
guardians ad litem; their interests clearly were adverse.57 The majority
noted that her parents' knowledge of the litigation would chill the pri-
vacy interest plaintiff was asserting5" and held that conditioning the
lawsuit's progression on parental notice would have a similar, unneces-
sary, chilling effect.59 Because the minor's alleged privacy right out-
weighed accommodation of parental concerns at this stage of the
proceeding, the court's order was improper and dismissal for failure to
comply with it was an abuse of discretion.'
Judge Henley, in dissent, reasoned that the propriety of the district
court's dismissal involved the resolution of two issues. First, he agreed
with the majority that it would be improper for plaintiffs parents to act
48. "A requirement of prior parental consulation is merely one illustration of permissible
regulation in this area." 431 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
49. 557 F.2d 170 (1977).
50. Id. at 174.
51. Id. at 175.
52. Id. (quoting Graves v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Co., 528 F.2d 1360, 1361 (5th Cir. 1976)).
53. Id.
54. Plaintiff's counsel requested that the court appoint him or a former family planning di-
rector as guardian ad litem. Id. at 173 n.2.
55. Id. at 175 (citing Allied Air Freight, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 393 F.2d 441
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 846 (1968); Michael v. Clark Equip. Co., 380 F.2d 351 (2d Cir.
1967); Original Ballet Russe Ltd. v. Ballet Theatre, Inc., 133 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1943)).
56. 557 F.2d at 173.
57. Id. at 176.
58. Id. (citing Roe v. Ingraham, 346 F. Supp. 536, 541 n.7 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
groundr, 480 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1973)).
59. 557 F.2d at 176.
60. Id.
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as guardians ad litem.61 It did not follow, however, that her parents
should not be notified of the guardian ad litem hearing.62 Because
minors often are unable to determine their best interests, the state and
the minor's parents are empowered to protect children from in-advised
decisions.63 The right of plaintiff's parents to the control and custody
of their child required that they be notified of her involvement in the
litigation.' Notice would enable the parents to insure that the minor's
decision to litigate was not unduly influenced by outsiders.65 Thus, the
dissent concluded, the minor's right to privacy in litigation does not
outweigh the parent's right to know their child is a party plaintiff.66
Although Rule 41(b) facilitates the smooth dispensation of justice
and insures the efficacy of court orders,67 its unfettered use may result
in injustice.6 8 In M.S. v. Wermers,69 the majority held that the district
court abused its discretion under Rule 41(b) because compliance with
its order would have compromised the privacy interest plaintiff was
asserting?70 The court's holding turns on its implicit recognition of a
broad privacy right for minors.
The court correctly concluded that plaintiff's parents could not prop-
erly act as guardians ad litem; it does not necessarily follow, however,
that they must be excluded from the guardian ad litem hearing. This
61. Id. (Henley, J., dissenting).
62. While it may be inappropriate to appoint parents to act as guardians ad litem in
litigation challenging a grant of parental veto power, it does not follow that it is equally
inappropriate to condition the further progress of the lawsuit upon notification to the
parents of the hearing on the appointment of a guardian ad litem. There is a crucial
distinction between appointing parents to serve as guardians ad litem and notifying them
that their minor child is involved in serious litigation for which a guardian ad litem may
be appointed.
Id.
63. Id. at 177-78.
64. Consonant with this right [the right of parents to the control and custody of their
minor children], parents may need to know that their minor child has embarked upon a
course of litigation, particularly where they probably will not serve as guardians ad litem
and where the outcome of the action need not be fatally affected by their awareness of it.
Id. at 178.
65. Id.
66. Id. The dissent, however, specifically stated that its view of the propriety of parental
notice was not dispositive of the merits of plaintiffs action. "Though the two decisions may
involve the analysis of similar elements, a finding in favor of the parental right at this stage of the
proceedings would not preclude a different finding upon consideration of the merits of the case,"
Id.
67. See notes 7-10 supra and accompanying text.
68. See notes 11-14 supra and accompanying text.
69. 557 F.2d at 176.
70. Id.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss2/7
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conclusion results only if the majority believed the plaintiff was assert-
ing a broader privacy interest than the right to obtain contraceptives
without parental consent. Certainly the minor's right to privacy in
pursuing litigation, at issue in the court's notification order, was
broader than the right to obtain contraceptives without parental con-
sent, at issue in the law suit. The court could have upheld the district
court's order without chilling the right to obtain contraceptives. The
fact that it did not suggests that it implicitly recognized a broad privacy
right in minors.
Because the dissent acknowledged the distinction between the pri-
vacy interests involved, it reasoned that compliance with the court or-
der would not chill the narrow interest at issue in the litigation.71 The
minor's right to challenge a parental consent statute and the parents'
interest in their child's decision to litigate the matter are not mutually
exclusive; notifying the plaintiffs parents of the guardian hearing is not
dispositive of the merits.72
If the MS. majority intended to endorse a broad privacy right in
minors, its decision is inconsistent with recent Supreme Court deci-
sions. Although Danforth and Carey struck down blanket parental
vetoes over minors in their use of contraceptives and abortions,7 3 the
concurring and dissenting opinions in these cases and the Belloti re-
mand decision suggest that parents have a right to share in a minor's
decisions relating to sexual activity.74 A minor's privacy interest does
not dominate the parents' right to control their children and, the Court
seems to be saying, parental involvement-short of a veto-in the mi-
nor's decision satisfactorily accommodates the two interests.75
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favor disposition of litigation
on substantive rather than procedural grounds.76 By excusing the plain-
71. See notes 62 & 64 supra.
72. See note 62 supra.
73. See notes 38-41 supra.
74. See notes 42-48 supra and accompanying text.
75. Admittedly, even minimal parental involvement in the minor's decision to use contracep-
tives may be tantamount to a veto. To maintain that a child is able to approach her parents and
seek their reasoned advice in the use of contraceptives presupposes an exceedingly stable and open
family relationship. Adolescents are often reluctant to discuss sexual matters with their parents.
See Stein, Furnishing Information and Medical Treatment to Minors for Prevention, Termination
and Treatment of Pregnancy, 5 CLEAMNGHOUSE REV. 131, 154 (1971). A minor's desire to avoid
parental confrontation may discourage obtaining birth control materials as effectively as parental
veto power. Cf. State v. Koome, 48 Wash. 2d 901, 906, 530 P.2d 260, 264 (1975) (requiring
minors to consult their parents may unduly limit a minor's right to obtain an abortion).
76. See, eg., Reizakis v. Loy, 490 F.2d 1132, 1135 (4th Cir. 1974) (Rule 41(b) is contrary toWashington University Open Scholarship
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tiff from complying with a court order that would chill the privacy
right being asserted, the Eighth Circuit complied with this policy. In
light of recent Supreme Court decisions, however, the majority's hold-
ing in MS. is questionable. Along with the court's efforts to rectify a
perceived denial of procedural justice, it has afforded the minor plain-
tiff a privacy interest exceeding that recognized by the Supreme Court.
the judicial policy of deciding cases on their merits); Sepia Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Toledo, 462
F.2d 1315, 1318 (6th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Almance Indus. v. Filene's, 291 F.2d 142, 146 (Ist
Cir. 1961) (court consideration of expedition for its own sake over the rights of the plaintiff causes
emphasis of secondary considerations over primary ones); Fakouri v. Cadais, 147 F.2d 667, 669
(5th Cir. 1945) (the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure indicate a policy of disregarding technicali-
ties and a preference for deciding claims on their merits). See generally Note, xpra note 14, at
464.
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